tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3873756940955163469.post8617166429015084569..comments2024-03-18T18:05:25.821-07:00Comments on VISIONS OF THE NORTH: Sir John Franklin: Fact and Fiction (Part 1 of 2)Russell Potterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11023313195827310776noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3873756940955163469.post-8810577357938895112009-02-22T08:43:00.000-08:002009-02-22T08:43:00.000-08:00Russell,You are exactly right. My point is not th...Russell,<BR/><BR/>You are exactly right. <BR/><BR/>My point is not that it was sensible to select only 30% of officers with previous Polar experience. It was not. It's rather that that percentage is actually DOUBLE that of the 1839 Expedition. And presumably it was either Crozier or James Ross who made the selections for the 1839 voyage?<BR/><BR/>It goes without saying that it was crazy to send those big ships with their big crews there at all. The sea-route they thought they would take should have been surveyed by land first, using small parties which did as Rae did and blended Inuit knowledge with modern guns, etc. (But did Rae use dogs?)<BR/><BR/>I think Fitzjames deserves credit for selecting a higher proportion of officers with some relevant Polar experience than was typical at the time, and also in his other selections for picking people who he knew would be get on with each other and work as a team. Witnesses all say that in the early days of the Expedetion both ships, especially Erebus, were very happy ships. As I said - contrast that with Belcher, who was in a class of his own for unpleasantness, but also with James and John Ross, neither of whom ran particularly happy ships.<BR/><BR/>Thanks again,<BR/><BR/>WilliamWilliam Battersbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00452863778733148002noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3873756940955163469.post-42659518523105151312009-02-22T08:02:00.000-08:002009-02-22T08:02:00.000-08:00p.s. -- a correction: *three* officers (I'd forgot...p.s. -- a correction: *three* officers (I'd forgotten to count Gore, though of course as things happened he died before the final march).Russell Potterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11023313195827310776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3873756940955163469.post-20612257160276879312009-02-22T07:58:00.000-08:002009-02-22T07:58:00.000-08:00All good points! I would agree that there the 30%...All good points! I would agree that there the 30% figure is accurate, but also somewhat misleading. Looking at the order of command, starting with Franklin himself, Crozier, then to Fitzjames, then to the 1st and 2nd lieutenants, and so forth, and setting aside the medical staff, you really only have *two* men with experience in the Arctic. GIven that the chain of command is one of the last things any naval expedition would set aside -- evidence on the ground suggests that the crews of each ship continued to camp and travel as a unit -- this seems to me a fairly serious problem. Granted, had the expedition been able to remain aboard its ships, there's no reason that the crews would have been in any sense less qualified or able to serve, but when it comes to overland travel on the ice and snow, I should think that actual polar experience would make a tremendous difference, and the shortage of such experience among the senior officers a problem. I think it is fair to assume that, had Crozier had his pick of officers, that he'd have chosen more than 30% with polar experience, though this is speculative. The proportion was not necessarily anomalous, but giving this responsibility to Fitzjames rather than Cozier was certainly a departure from tradition. There's speculation about why this happened -- I don't want to give any spoilers on the revelations promised by your book, but Fitzjames's connections were likely a factor.<BR/><BR/>Having looked over the original muster rolls, I agree it's likely that many of the seamen who enlisted might have had previous Arctic experience -- but again, this would not necessarily translated to the skills needed for overland travel.<BR/><BR/>The Royal Navy did not really develop a good system for overland travel until the Franklin searching expeditions; McClintock is widely credited with developing the best methods, and continued to consult with the Navy up through RF Scott's expedition. Even then, they eschewed dogs in favor of men.<BR/><BR/>I do feel sorry for the Royal Marines -- they were low-paid to begin with, and were the only men on board not entitled to double wages.Russell Potterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11023313195827310776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3873756940955163469.post-1853099205124056232009-02-22T06:50:00.000-08:002009-02-22T06:50:00.000-08:00Hi Russell,I think the website is great.As you kno...Hi Russell,<BR/><BR/>I think the website is great.<BR/><BR/>As you know I have done a lot of research into James Fitzjames. From this perspective can I kick off by taking slight issue with your point 4 about the alleged inexperience of the officers and men of the Franklin Expedition in sailing in Polar regions? This is often repeated, but I think when we look at the evidence it is probably a myth. Fitzjames was in charge of recruitment for the Expedition once Franklin, Crozier and he had been appointed. It appears that actually he selected a higher proportion of officers and men with direct Polar experience than was normal for Royal Naval Polar Expeditions of the time. <BR/><BR/>Of the eighteen seaman officers (including the Ice Masters), it seems that six of them (Franklin, Crozier, Gore, Reid, Blanky and probably Collins) had prior experience of sailing in the Arctic or Antarctic. Of the six non-seamen officers, the two pursers and the four doctors, two (Osmer and Stanley) definitely had prior Arctic experience. So however we count them, fully one third of the officers had prior Arctic experience. I would image that the 'one third' proportion for both totals is probably not a coincidence. Of those who did not have Polar experience, most were former mess-mates of Fitzjames who he knew well. On a voyage where the ships would be isolated from the outside world for a long time, compatibility would have been extremely important. Other voyages both before and since are known to have been riven with dissent where officers' personalities were incompatible (John Ross, Belcher!). It made sense that, once he had a good selection of Polar Arctic veterans, Fitzjames would select officers who he knew to be compatible. This he seems to have done. <BR/><BR/>In addition to these officers, the ships' complements were forty eight men plus two boys on Erebus and forty eight men plus three boys on Terror. The distinction between a ‘man’ and a ‘boy’ was simply one of age – boys were under twenty years old. Neither ship sailed with its full complement, but nine of the sailors who did had previously served under either Ross or Crozier on the Erebus or Terror during their Antarctic cruise of 1839-1843, so were definitely Arctic veterans. Only twenty eight were listed as ‘first entry’, meaning that they had not previously served on Royal Navy ships. Their average age was high for the time, at twenty eight years old, so most will have been experienced merchant seamen. It is likely that some had served on Arctic whaling ships. <BR/><BR/>Each ship also carried eight Royal Marines. None of seem to have been Arctic veterans, although it would not have been thought that they needed to be. The Royal Marine Commandant at Woolwich was asked to select candidates for the Expedition from "among those who are constitutionally best adapted to the service". <BR/><BR/>In 1839 when Ross and Crozier sailed to the Antarctic in the Erebus and the Terror, the ships took the same number of officers, although with a different mix of ranks and skills. Two of these were enormously experienced Polar veterans – Ross and Crozier - and two others were almost as experienced. Edward Bird had served on Parry's second, third and fourth voyages and in the Cove and Archibald McMurdo had served on Back's ill-fated Expedition in the Terror. It appears that none of the other officers had any prior Polar experience.<BR/><BR/>So I make it that probably 30% of the officers Fitzjames selected had Arctic (or Antarctic) experience, compared with only 15% on the Ross Expedition of 1839. I'm not saying that mistakes weren't made in the recruitment for the Expedtion, simply that it wasn't anomalous at the time. I also haven't looked at other Expeditions, which would be interesting.William Battersbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00452863778733148002noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3873756940955163469.post-4971753633489399372009-02-22T06:34:00.000-08:002009-02-22T06:34:00.000-08:00A great question. And remarkably, there's a very ...A great question. And remarkably, there's a very direct answer: yes. Among the many books on board "Erebus" and "Terror" was a copy of Back's account of his descent and ascent of the river that bore his name. Back had undertaken the trip to search for Sir John Ross in 1833, not knowing that Ross had been rescued by a whaling ship, and described the "difficult and toilsome" journey in excruciating detail (the entire volume is available via Google Books). It's conceivable that the crews planned to use Back's narrative as a guide to the many portages, rapids, and waterfalls, but given that they had oaken whaleboats weighing hundreds of pounds instead of birch-bark canoes, and lacked snow-shoes and other vital equipment, it's hard to imagine men with their full mental capacity making such a choice. Cyriax notes that the whaleboats had been lightened and their gunwales trimmed down, possibly "for river travel." All of which is why my personal guess is that this was not, in fact, their plan, and that the boats were only intended to make a crossing back to the mainland.Russell Potterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11023313195827310776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3873756940955163469.post-85810003078638000242009-02-22T05:39:00.000-08:002009-02-22T05:39:00.000-08:00Thanks for writing this. I was not aware of the ne...Thanks for writing this. I was not aware of the new theory that the lead may have come from the ships distillation system.<BR/><BR/>I have a question. When you say "the men planned to ascend Back’s River and make for the Hudson’s Bay posts on the Great Slave Lake. Such a plan, involving difficult travel on modified whaleboats, numerous portages, and rough water, could quite easily be called insane", obviously, we know how difficult this trip is today. Did Franklin's men really know how difficult this trip would have been (other than the length)?Paigehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16338031822632699399noreply@blogger.com